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IOWA BAN ON PACKER OWNERSHIP OF
LIVESTOCK RULED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
— by Roger A. McEowen* and Neil E. Harl**
In Smithfield Foods, Inc. et. al. v. Miller,1 th  Federal District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa ruled unconstitutional  Iowa’s prohibition against swine processors
owning, controlling or operating swine operations in the state.2  T  opinion is viewed
by many as crucial with respect to its potential impact on the maintenance of
competition in hog procurement for slaughter, and on the overall structure of the hog
industry in Iowa.  The key questions that remain after the court’s opinion are whether
the case will be upheld on appeal, and whether the court’s opinion will generate
additional momentum for federal legislation addressing the issue of packer ownership
of livestock.
Anti-Corporate Farming Statutes
For decades, legislatures in states where agriculture plays a predominant role in the
state’s economy have expressed concern with corporate involvement in agricultural
production activities.  Presently, nine states prohibit corporations (with numerous
statutory exceptions for certain forms of corporations) from engaging in agriculture to
various degrees.3  More recently, consolidation in almost every aspect of the farm
economy has further threatened the continued viability of a vibrant, independently
owned and widely dispersed farm production sector with the specter of being vertically
integrated (largely through contractual arrangements) in the production, processing and
marketing functions.  Thus, as concentration of agricultural production has accelerated
in recent years, legislatures in many of these same states have attempted to legislate
protections for the economic autonomy of individual farmers and the environmental
health and safety of both the rural and non-rural sectors.
Iowa, through its anti-corporate farming provisions, prohibits unauthorized vertical
integration in the cattle and pork sectors.4  The Iowa provision makes it “unlawful… for
a processor of beef or pork… to own, control or operate a feedlot in Iowa in which hogs
or cattle are fed for slaughter.”5  The statute excepts cooperatively-owned processors.6
Non-exempted corporations, however, may still participate in agriculture by contracting
with farmers who own or lease land.  But, the Iowa provision, as originally enacted,
was designed to restrict a corporate processor’s ability to control all aspects of
production.  Processors soon realized, however, that they could avoid the reach of the
statute by feeding hogs under contract in neighboring states and transporting them to
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Iowa for processing, or feeding them in Iowa and
transporting them out of state for processing.
The Iowa Smithfield Matter
Smithfield is the nation’s largest pork processor, with
more than half of its sows owned by Murphy Farms which, in
turn, is wholly-owned by Smithfield Foods.  An Iowa
corporation, Prestage-Stoecker, financed by Smithfield,
contracted with Murphy Farms to buy feeder pigs.7  The
feeders pigs were shipped to Iowa, where Prestage-Stoecker
contracted with over 200 Iowa farms to finish the hogs.  The
finished hogs were then sold to IBP, Inc. for processing.  In
September of 1999, Smithfield announced its plan to acquire
all of Murphy Farm’s capital stock.  The Iowa Attorney
General challenged the transaction under Iowa Code § 9H.2,
and Smithfield modified the transaction.  In early, 2000,
Stoecker Farms, Inc. was formed as an Iowa family farm
corporation.  Murphy Farms sold its Iowa-based assets to
Stoecker and also assigned its contract with IBP, Inc. to
Stoecker.  Smithfield then purchased the non-Iowa assets of
Murphy Farms, with Murphy Farms providing out-of-state
feeder pigs to Stoecker, which contracted with Iowa farms for
finishing.  The finished hogs were then sold to IBP, Inc. for
processing.
The Iowa Attorney General challenged the transaction as
a sham.8  The Iowa legislature amended the law effective July
1, 2004, to tighten the contracting loophole by prohibiting
processors from “directly or indirectly contracting for the
care and feeding of swine in this state.”  The amendment also
expanded the exemption for cooperatives organized under
Iowa law.  The law was further amended in 2002 (again with
an effective date of July 1, 2004) to prohibit swine processors
from financing swine operations in Iowa or financing a
person who, either directly or indirectly, contracts for the care
and feeding of swine in Iowa.9  The 2002 amendment also
expanded the definition of “processor” to include an
individual who either holds, or within the past two years has
held, an executive position in a processor that has direct or
indirect control of processing operations valued at over $260
million.10  Based upon the amended statutory language, the
Iowa Attorney General advised Smithfield that it would be in
violation of the law as of July 1, 2004, unless they
discontinued their operations in the state.  In response,
Smithfield challenged the constitutionality of the amended
Iowa law on “dormant commerce clause” grounds.
The “Dormant Commerce Clause”
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article I,
§8, Clause 3) forbids discrimination against commerce,
which repeatedly has been held to mean that the state and
localities may not discriminate against the transactions of
out-of-state actors in interstate markets even when the
Congress has not legislated on the subject.11  Th  overriding
rationale of the commerce clause was to create and foster the
development of a common market among the states and to
eradicate internal trade barriers.  Thus, a state may not enact
rules or regulations requiring out-of-state commerce to be
conducted according to the enacting state’s terms.12
Historically, dormant commerce clause analysis has
attempted to balance national market principles with
federalism, and was never intended to eliminate the states’
power to regulate local activity, even though it is incidentally
related to interstate commerce.13 Ind ed, if state action also
involves an exercise of the state’s police power, the impact of
the action on interstate commerce is largely ignored.14 Absent
an exercise of a state’s police power, the courts evaluate
dormant commerce clause claims under a two-tiered
approach.  If the state has been motivated by a discriminatory
purpose, the state bears the burden to show that it is pursuing
a legitimate purpose that cannot be achieved with a
nondiscriminatory alternative.15 However, if the state
regulates without a discriminatory purpose but with a
legitimate purpose, the provision will be upheld unless the
burden on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the benefits that the state derives from the regulation.16
The Court’s “Dormant Commerce Clause” Analysis
The court opined that the amended version of the law17
facially discriminated against Smithfield, and was enacted
with a discriminatory  purpose to eliminate Smithfield from
op rating in Iowa.18  The court also found a discriminatory
purpose in the amended provision’s exemption for
cooperatives organized under Iowa law.   The court went on
to state that Iowa’s attempt to protect family farmers by
restricting vertical integration in the hog industry was
disingenuous, did not serve a legitimate state purpose, and
constituted nothing more than unconstitutional economic
protectionism.
Serious questions can be raised concerning the court’s
analysis.  Clearly, the test is whether the Iowa provision has
an extraterritorial reach that imposes restrictions on packers
attempting to own, control or operate a feedlot outside the
state of Iowa.19  It appears that Smithfield can easily avoid
the impact of the Iowa law by not attempting to own, control
or operate an Iowa feedlot in ways the statute forbids by
co tracting with producers outside Iowa’s borders. In that
event, the Iowa restriction would be constitutional on
dormant commerce clause grounds.  Similarly, the statute
makes no distinction between in-state and out-of-state
processors, but prohibits specific conduct by all processors
regardless of location.  The only exception is for processors
organized as a cooperative under the Iowa laws.  Importantly,
Iowa law provides that a foreign cooperative may be
organized under Iowa law as an Iowa cooperative without
being physically present in Iowa.  Thus, the court’s claim that
the legislation discriminates between Iowa and non-Iowa
cooperatives seems questionable.  To operate in Iowa within
the parameters of the law, Smithfield would need to
reorganize its business enterprise in the cooperative form.
Thus, the law does not prevent the conduct that Smithfield is
desirous of engaging in, but merely requires that it be
conducted in a specific organizational form with sufficient
farmer ownership.
The court seemingly downplayed the rationale of the state
in enacting restrictions on vertical integration in pork
pr cessing in Iowa.  The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit (the court that will hear the appeal in this
case) has noted that preservation of the family farm and the
rural economy are legitimate reasons for state legislation.20
Also, the rationale for such legislation has been well
documented.21  Likewise, the preamble to Iowa Code § 9H.2
states that the purpose of the law is “… to preserve free and
private enterprise, prevent monopoly, and protect
consumers.”  That would appear, under the Eighth Circuit
test, to be a legitimate state interest.
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What Does the Future Hold?
A ban on packer ownership of livestock has been
proposed at the federal level and has passed the U.S. Senate
on two occasions.22  If the Iowa court’s opinion is upheld on
appeal, it could undermine existing ownership bans in other
states, and forestall additional states from attempting to pass
similar laws.  Also, the opinion could increase pressure to
pass federal legislation banning packer ownership.23
In any event, the court’s decision is important for the
future structure of agriculture and what state governments
can do, if anything, to help shape that structure.
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TAXATION OF LIVESTOCK
COMPENSATION PROGRAM PAYMENTS
By Roger A. McEowen*
In the fall of 2002, the USDA announced the creation of
the Livestock Compensation Program (LCP) designed to
provide financial assistance to those livestock producers
suffering from extreme drought in certain parts of the
country.  Signup began on October 1, 2002, with the program
available to those in counties that received primary disaster
designation due to drought in 2001 or 2002, as well as those
in counties that had disaster designation requests pending as
of September 19, 2002, that were subsequently approved.
The amount of payments under the program is based on
standard feed consumption data for each eligible type of
livestock (beef cows, dairy cows, stockers, buffalo and
beefalo, sheep and goats), with the payment rate set at $18.00
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per animal consuming unit.  The animals must have been
owned for 90 days or more before and/or after June 1, 2002.
Reports have surfaced that LCP payments are not subject
to income tax.  Unfortunately, there is no specific statutory
exclusion for disaster payments. Apparently, the belief that
LCP payments are not taxable is based upon a belief that LCP
payments constitute welfare.  While various types of disaster
payments made to individuals have been excluded from gross
income under a general welfare exception, see, e.g., Rev. Rul.
98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 840, that exception only applies if the
payments are made under legislatively provided social benefit
programs for the promotion of the general welfare.  Indeed,
in Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17 and Rev. Rul. 75-246,
1975-1 C.B. 24 the IRS addressed the general exception from
income for welfare benefits received by individuals from
governmental units under legislatively provided social benefit
programs.  However, in the rulings, IRS noted that payments
under governmental programs that represent compensation
for lost wages or lost profits are includible in gross income.
For instance, under I.R.C. § 85, the exception from income
for welf re benefits is made inapplicable to unemployment
compensation.  In addition, the legislative history of I.R.C. §
139(b)(4) states that the exclusion does not apply to payments
that are in the nature of income replacement. I.R.C. §
139(b)(4) codifies the general welfare exception for payments
to individuals in connection with a qualified disaster.
Consequently, there is little doubt that LCP payments
constitute income replacement and are, therefore, subject to
income taxation in the hands of the recipient.
*Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics and Extension
Specialist, Agricultural Law and Policy, Kansas State University,
member of Kansas and Nebraska Bars.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ESTATE PROPERTY . The debtor owned an interest in
an ERISA qualified I.R.C. § 401(k) pension plan. Although
the IRS agreed that the plan was not part of the bankruptcy
estate, the IRS argued that the plan was subject to a tax lien
such that the tax lien was a secured claim. The court held that
the plan was not estate property for any bankruptcy purpose,
including securing a tax lien. In re Wingfield, 284 B.R. 787
(E.D. Va. 2002).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtor failed to file income tax returns
for two tax years and the IRS made assessments based upon
substitute returns created by the IRS. The taxpayer then filed
income tax returns which used the amounts assessed by the
IRS as the taxes owed. The IRS entered into an installment
payment agreement with the taxpayer but the taxpayer failed
to complete the payments and filed for bankruptcy. The court
held that the taxes were nondischargeable because the
taxpayer’s late returns did not qualify as returns for purposes
of Section 523(a)(1) since they did not add to the information
already included on the substitute returns. In re Weintraub,
2003-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,195 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2003).
The taxpayer failed to file income tax returns for 1988
through 1997. The IRS made assessments based on substitute
returns it constructed. One year later the taxpayer filed
income tax returns for the missing years, and the IRS treated
the returns as amended returns and reduced the assessment.
The court held that the returns filed by the taxpayer were
considered returns under Section 523(a)(1) because the
returns were accepted as amended returns and affected the
amount of tax assessed. In re Izzo, 2003-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,190 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2002).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. The plaintiffs were a group of
farmers who purchased or attempted to purchase a crop
revenue coverage (CRC) insurance policy for their durum
wheat during the 2001 crop year. The FCIC determined that a
base price for durum wheat could not be established without
an illegal amendment to the policy and terminated the policy.
The policy provided for determination of the base price on
the September futures contract, if it included at least 15 days
of daily settlement prices. If the September futures contracts
do not c tain at least 15 trading days, then the July futures
are used, again requiring at least 15 trading days. The trading
days actually occurred in the previous February and
November. In this case, the September and July futures
together id not have a total of 15 trading days. The FCIC
argued that this prevented any policy from being issued. The
plaintiffs argued that the FCIC could have used as many of
the March futures trading days as needed to make 15 trading
days. The court held that the FCIC interpretation of the policy
was correct and restricted the trading days to September and
July only. Because the CRC policy itself could not be
changed, termination was the proper remedy. Kust r v.
Veneman, 226 F. Supp.2d 1190 (D. N.D. 2002).
EXOTIC NEWCASTLE DISEASE . The APHIS has
issued interim regulations amending the exotic Newcastle
disease regulations by quarantining Clark County and a
portion of Nye County in Nevada and prohibiting or
restricting the movement of birds, poultry, products, and
materials that could spread exotic Newcastle disease from the
quarantin d area. 68 Fed. Reg. 3375 (Jan. 24, 2003).
